Webster v. Doe: Toward Constitutional Protection of Gays against Governmental Discrimination by Prince, Timothy P.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 16
Number 4 Summer 1989 Article 6
1-1-1989
Webster v. Doe: Toward Constitutional Protection
of Gays against Governmental Discrimination
Timothy P. Prince
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Timothy P. Prince, Webster v. Doe: Toward Constitutional Protection of Gays against Governmental Discrimination, 16 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 639 (1989).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol16/iss4/6
Webster v. Doe: Toward Constitutional
Protection of Gays Against
Governmental Discrimination
Introduction
The United States Supreme Court, in Webster v. Doe,1 largely reaf-
firmed its traditional "hands off" approach to constitutional review of
claims of governmental discrimination against homosexuals. In the opin-
ion, delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist on June 15, 1988, the Court
"decline[d] to consider ... at this stage of the litigation" whether the
Constitution precludes an agency of the federal government from dis-
charging an employee based solely on his sexual orientation.2 Neverthe-
less, the Court offered some hope that it might assume a more active role
in deciding such cases in the future.
The Court held that employment termination decisions made by the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) according to his broad
discretion pursuant to section 102(c) of the National Security Act of
19471 were not reviewable under sections 701 to 706 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.4 The Court found that the Director's decisions were
subject to constitutional review, however, and it remanded the case to the
District Court for the District of Columbia for review of Doe's constitu-
tional claims.5 The Court expressly refused to adopt the Government's
argument that Doe had failed to present even a colorable constitutional
claim.6
This Comment first analyzes preclusion of judicial review under the
APA and under the Constitution, and then addresses the underlying
claim in Webster - equal protection rights of homosexuals in the public
employment context. Part I presents the factual background of the case.
Part II sets out the legal background of the issue of statutory preclusion
of judicial review under the APA, and discusses the analysis of the issue
by the majority and dissent in Webster. Part III discusses the Court's
treatment in Webster of the issue of constitutional preclusion of judicial
1. 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988).
2. Id. at 2054 n.9.
3. 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1982) [hereinafter NSA].
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 706 (1982) [hereinafter APA]. 108 S. Ct. at 2049-53.
5. 108 S. Ct. at 2053-54.
6. 108 S. Ct. at 2054 n.9. See Brief for the Petitioner at 27-28 n.23, Webster v. Doe, 108
S. Ct. 2047 (1988) (No. 86-1294).
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review. Part IV argues that the Court should address the merits of the
equal protection claim raised by Doe. The Comment concludes that the
Court should act promptly to overrule or limit its prior 5-4 decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick,7 which held that homosexuals have no fundamental
right under the Constitution to engage in sodomy, and should establish
homosexuality as a quasi-suspect classification entitled to heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny when subjected to discriminatory governmental practices.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The respondent in Webster, proceeding under the pseudonym John
Doe because of his sensitive position as a covert electronics technician,
had an unblemished record with the CIA during his nine years of em-
ployment. Doe received promotions and consistent ratings of excellent
or outstanding on periodic fitness reviews.8 The CIA's dissatisfaction
with Doe began in 1982, when Doe voluntarily informed a CIA security
officer that he was a homosexual.9 Doe was promptly placed on adminis-
trative leave.
Doe maintained that he was open and not ashamed about his homo-
sexuality l° and that he was not susceptible to blackmail.1 ' Doe also al-
leged that he had never had sexual relations with, nor disclosed classified
information to, foreign nationals.' 2 On two occasions, Doe was inter-
viewed by a CIA polygraph officer, who concluded that Doe's denials of
disclosure or of sexual relations with foreign nationals were truthful. 3
Despite these facts and the government's failure to allege any impro-
prieties other than Doe's sexual orientation, Doe was told by a CIA se-
curity officer "that the circumstances of his homosexuality posed a
security threat,"' 4 and he was asked to resign. The officer refused to
elaborate. 5 When Doe refused to resign, the Office of Security recom-
mended to the Director that Doe be dismissed.' 6 Upon review, the Di-
rector determined that it was "necessary and advisable in the interests of
the United States to terminate" Doe's employment.' 7 The CIA offered
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8. 108 S. Ct. at 2049.
9. Id.
10. Brief for Respondent at 2, Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988) (No. 86-1294).
11. Id.
12. 108 S. Ct. at 2049.
13. Id.
14. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6, at 4.
15. Id.
16. 108 S. Ct. at 2049.
17. Id. at 2049-50 (quoting letter from CIA Deputy Counsel to respondent's counsel, May
11, 1982). Director Webster, respondent, was preceded by Director Casey, who made the final
decision to terminate Doe's employment.
no specific reasons for the decision.18
Doe filed an action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia seeking reinstatement or a statement of reasons for the
discharge.19 He alleged that the CIA had fired him because of his homo-
sexuality, denying him equal protection of the laws and violating his con-
stitutional right to privacy.20 Doe also alleged that the CIA had violated
its own regulations and section 706 of the APA,2 and had deprived him
of liberty and property without due process of law.22 The district court
granted Doe's motion for partial summary judgment, deciding that the
NSA does not preclude judicial review under the APA and that the CIA
had violated its own procedures, but declining to decide Doe's constitu-
tional claims.23
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that re-
view under the APA was possible, but determined that the CIA had not
violated its regulations.24 It found the record unclear as to the Director's
reason for terminating Doe, but stated that if Doe had been discharged as
part of a ban against employing homosexuals, the discharge would give
rise to an arguable constitutional claim.2" The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide the question whether the Director's decision to dis-
charge an employee pursuant to section 102(c) of the NSA was judicially
reviewable.26
II. Statutory Preclusion
This section of the Comment first briefly describes the APA and the
NSA, and then summarizes the Webster majority and dissenting opin-
ions regarding preclusion of review under the APA. Following a discus-
sion of the line of cases governing statutory preclusion of judicial review
18. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 4.
19. Doe v. Casey, 601 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd 796 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
rev'd in part sub nom. Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988).
20. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Doe v. Casey, 601 F.Supp
581 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-5291), see Joint Appendix at 5, 12-13, Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct.
2047 (1988) (No. 86-1294).
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 706. Section 706 provides reviewing courts with the power to
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law.
5 U.S.C. § 706.
22. Amended Complaint, supra note 20 at 12.
23. Doe v. Casey, 601 F. Supp. at 590.
24. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1513-20 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
25. Id. at 1522.
26. Webster v. Doe, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987).
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of federal agency action, this section concludes with an analysis of the
portion of the Webster Court's decision relating to that line of cases.
A. Statutory Context
The federal government formerly enjoyed significantly more free-
dom from judicial intervention than it does today. Absent congressional
authorization or consent, an agency of the federal government could not
be sued, and the United States had unlimited "power to withdraw the
privilege of suing the United States or its instrumentalities." 7 Although
this doctrine has continued validity today, 8 the APA"9 now guarantees
that most actions of federal agencies are subject to review unless one of
the specified exceptions applies. Section 701(a) of the APA creates two
exceptions to reviewability: "(1) [when] statutes preclude judicial review;
or (2) [when] agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."30
Congress adopted the NSA3 1 shortly after World War II and one
year after it adopted the APA. The NSA established the CIA to acquire
and analyze intelligence data.32 Because Congress was aware that se-
crecy is important to the ability to conduct intelligence activities, 33 it
provided the Director of Central Intelligence with broad discretion in the
control of personnel. The NSA states that the Director may "terminate
the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he
shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the
United States . . . "I' but does not address the issue of judicial review.
The legislative history of the NSA is silent regarding its intended interac-
tion with the APA.
B. The Majority Opinion
The Webster majority found that section 701(a)(2) of the APA pre-
cluded judicial review of the Director's employment termination deci-
sions.35 The Court reasoned that since section 102(c) of the NSA allows
termiation of a CIA employee whenever the Director "shall deem [it]
27. Maricopa County v. Valley Nat'l. Bank of Phoenix, 318 U.S. 357, 362 (1943).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
29. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 706.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). For a discussion of the APA and its recent application by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, including the Court's ruling in Doe v. Casey, see Administrative Law:
Availability of Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 729 (1987).
31. National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 and 50 U.S.C.).
32. See S. REP. No. 239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 961, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-4 (1947); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 (1985).
33. 471 U.S. at 172. See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 18 n.14.
34. 50 U.S.C. § 403(c).
35. 108 S. Ct. at 2053. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
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necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States'. . [and] not
simply when the dismissal is necessary or advisable[,] '" 6 the NSA exhib-
its "extraordinary deference to the Director."37 The Court concluded
that the language of section 102(c) indicates that "Congress meant to
commit individual employee discharges to the Director's discretion
$,38
The Court relied on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,39
which interpreted section 701(a)(2) as applicable "in those rare instances
where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there
is no law to apply.' "" According to the Webster Court, review under
the APA is possible only when a "meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency's exercise of discretion"41 can be identified. The Court
found no such meaningful standard, since only "cross-examination of the
Director concerning his views of the Nation's security" would allow a
court to "properly assess an Agency termination decision. "42
C. Dissenting Opinions
Both Justices who wrote separately favored a broader reading of the
"committed to agency discretion by law" exception to reviewability, re-
sulting in even stricter limits on judicial oversight over agency decisions.
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court's analysis, but not the result, of
its APA preclusion decision, arguing that the Court's "no law to apply"
test is too narrow and should be expanded to exclude review of cases
such as those involving sensitive and inherently discretionary judgments,
judgments that have traditionally been nonreviewable, as well as those
cases in which review would be disruptive to the agency as a practical
matter.43 In her brief opinion, Justice O'Connor concurred with the por-
tion of the Court's opinion denying APA review, subject to the qualifica-
tion that "the exception in § 701(a)(2) is [not] necessarily or fully defined
by reference to statutes 'drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply.'""
D. The "Committed to Agency Discretion" Exception
The Webster Court drew upon a line of cases regarding statutory
36. Id. at 2052 (emphasis in original) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)).
37. Id. at 2052-53.
38. Id. at2053.
39. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
40. Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)); see infra notes
46-49 and accompanying text.
41. 108 S. Ct. at 2052 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2057 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2055 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
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preclusion of review and the meaning of section 701(a)(2) of the APA,45
which provides an exception to reviewability when an action is commit-
ted to agency discretion by law. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,16 the
Court found a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency
action, ruling that statutory preclusion of review could be established
only by "clear and convincing evidence" constituting "persuasive reason
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."'47
The Court stated in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe48 that
the exception to the presumption of reviewability for action committed to
agency discretion was "very narrow" and only applicable "in those rare
instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given
case there is no law to apply.' ,,4' The Court in Volpe found that there
was law to apply because the relevant statutes barred the Secretary of
Transportation from approving highway construction projects "through
public parks if a 'feasible and prudent' alternative route exists.""0 Thus,
because of the "feasible and prudent" qualification, the Court determined
that the Secretary's decision was not committed to agency discretion by
law."1
In Heckler v. Chaney,5" the Court purported to follow its "no law to
apply" test, but relaxed it somewhat. The applicable statute giving the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) power to enforce provisions
prohibiting misbranding, and requiring FDA approval of new drugs, was
found to "commit complete discretion to the Secretary" of Health and
Human Services. 3 The Court stated that the "committed to agency dis-
cretion" exception required that "review is not to be had if the statute is
drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which
to judge the agency's exercise of discretion."54 Therefore, the FDA's
failure to enforce a prohibition of certain drugs used in conjunction with
administering the death penalty constituted an unreviewable exercise of
discretion under the APA 5
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Padula v. Webster56 found that the Federal Bureau of Investi-
45. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
46. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
47. Id. at 140-41. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667
(1986).
48. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
49. Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
50. 401 U.S. at 405 (quoting Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1653(f) (Supp. V 1964)).
51. Id. at 413.
52. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
53. Id. at 835.
54. Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 837-38.
56. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
gation's (FBI) policy regarding employment of homosexuals was com-
mitted to agency discretion by law, and, therefore, was nonreviewable
under the APA.57 The court expanded the "no law to apply" test to
include the agency's "formal and informal policy statements and regula-
tions as well as ... statutes . . . ."" In rejecting the homosexual's claim,
the court argued that it could find neither a "meaningful statutory stan-
dard [nor] voluntarily adopted, binding policies that limit [the FBI's] dis-
cretion."59 Thus, the court said that it could not find law to apply under
the APA. Although the FBI had issued various statements and letters
regarding their policy of hiring homosexuals, the court said "the FBI was
very careful-if a bit clever-not to tie its hands in any way."60
E. Analysis
The courts have moved far from the original requirement in Abbott
Laboratories that review under the APA can be precluded only by clear
and convincing evidence.6" The government must now show statutory
language or intent precluding review, or an absence of any meaningful
standard for review of the agency action, in order to overcome the pre-
sumption of reviewability.62 Webster, like Padula, strained to find an ab-
sence of any meaningful standard that courts could apply,63 despite the
standard set forth in the NSA: "the Director ... may ... terminate the
employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever (the Di-
rector) shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States .... "64
The "no meaningful standard" inquiry6' allows clever agencies and
courts to preempt judicial review without any real inquiry into whether
Congress intended to allow agencies unbridled discretion. The APA was
intended "to afford a remedy for every legal wrong."66 Congress recog-
nized that statutes "[v]ery rarely withhold judicial review."67 Only in the
absence of "statutory standards, definitions, or other grants of power"
that guide agency action was the "no law to apply" exception intended to
57. Id. at 100.
58. Id. at 100. The Supreme Court in Heckler had left open the question "whether an
agency's rules might under certain circumstances provide courts with adequate guidelines for
informed judicial review" under the APA. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 836 (1985).
59. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d at 100.
60. Id. at 101.
61. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
63. Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. at 2052; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
64. 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Heck-
ler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
66. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1945).
67. Id. at 26.
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prevail.6
8
Under the NSA, the Director's discretion to terminate employment
is not unlimited. It is qualified by allowing only terminations that the
Director believes to be in the best interests of the United States. Con-
gress arguably intended the standard to prevent arbitrary termination
such as claimed by Doe. The Director should bear the burden of demon-
strating a basis for his determination in court. This is the only interpre-
tation of the NSA that gives more than lip service to the congressional
requirement that the Director find terminations necessary or advisable in
the national interest. The Court's "no meaningful standard" inquiry cir-
cumvents the language of section 701(a)(2) of the APA and could keep
meritorious cases out of court.69
III. Constitutional Preclusion
Although the Court handled the issue of preclusion of constitutional
review in Webster largely as a matter of statutory interpretation, some
discussion of the background of the problem is necessary to understand
the Court's decision on this issue.
A. Background
The system of separation of powers set forth in the Constitution of
the United States leaves a critical question unresolved: whether Con-
gress can pass a law containing a provision that completely deprives the
federal courts of jurisdiction to review constitutional claims arising under
that law. The Supreme Court acknowledged this problem in Johnson v.
Robison,7° in which the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a stat-
ute that granted educational benefits to active duty veterans but disquali-
fied conscientious objectors who performed alternate civilian service.
The statute precluded judicial review of" 'decisions of the Administrator
on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veter-
ans Administration.' ,,71 The Supreme Court expressed a preference for
construction of statutes in a manner that avoids the "serious questions
concerning the constitutionality" of a statute barring federal courts from
deciding constitutional claims.72 The Court found that "no explicit pro-
vision" of the statute barred judicial consideration of the constitutional
68. Id.
69. For an argument concluding that such inquiry is unnecessary and "needlessly confus-
ing" see Sunstein, Constitutionalism After The New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 478 (1987).
For a recent application of the Webster APA analysis, see Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2d 1114 (9th
Cir. 1989) (denying APA review under the "no law to apply" analysis).
70. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
71. Id. at 367 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 211(a)).
72. Id. at 366-67. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667,
681 n.12 (1986).
claims,73 and upheld the veteran benefits statute under a rational basis
standard.74
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia elaborated on
this preference, requiring "clear and convincing" evidence that Congress
intended to preclude review when "constitutional rights form the basis of
the action over which judicial review is sought. '75 The court ruled that
due process requires the availability of a judicial forum for resolution of
constitutional claims.76
Article III of the U.S. Constitution bestows original or appellate ju-
risdiction upon the Supreme Court over all cases within "the judicial
Power of the United States,"7 7 but empowers Congress to make excep-
tions and regulations to its appellate jurisdiction.78 This ambivalence in
Article III provides no answer to the serious constitutional question that
would arise if Congress were to enact a statute that clearly precluded
review of constitutional claims. Although the Judiciary Act of 178979
granted the Court jurisdiction to hear specified types of cases without
making formal exceptions to its appellate jurisdiction,8" this "affirmative
description has been understood to imply a negation of the exercise of
such appellate power as is not comprehended within it."81
In Ex parte McCardle,2 the Court accepted the view that a statu-
tory grant of appellate jurisdiction was required for the Court to hear a
case.83 In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,84 however, the Court interpreted
Article III as requiring Congress "to vest the whole judicial power" in the
courts.8 The Court found this power to "extend to all cases" arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States,86 and that it could
"be exercised to the utmost constitutional extent.",87
Marbury v. Madison 18 established long ago that the judicial branch
is charged with the ultimate responsibility of determining constitutional
requirements.8 9 Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that "[t]he very es-
73. 415 U.S. at 367.
74. Id. at 381-82.
75. Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 704-07.
77. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
79. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
80. Id. at 80-81.
81. Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810).
82. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
83. Id. at 514.
84. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
85. Id. at 330 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 334 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 337.
88. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
89. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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sence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws. .. "9' A broad reading of Article III's
grant of power to Congress to make exceptions and regulations to the
judicial power would thus undermine the judicial branch's essential role
in a system of separation of powers. 91 Nevertheless, the Court itself has
precluded constitutional review in the past. For example, the Court has
held that "political questions" are nonjusticiable, in part because of the
doctrine of separation of powers, and in part because of the absence of an
adequate judicial standard to apply.92
B. The Webster Decision
The Webster Court rejected the Government's argument that judi-
cial review would jeopardize national security and that Congress in-
tended to preclude constitutional review. 93 "[I]n part to avoid the
'serious constitutional question' that would arise if a federal statute were
construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional
claim," 94 the Court found that any intent by Congress to preclude review
of constitutional claims must be "clear." 95 Presumably, this standard
would require some specific mention of the unavailability of constitu-
tional review in the law itself. The Court found no such clear intent in its
reading of the NSA.96
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued at length that Congress may
constitutionally determine which claims require a judicial remedy, mak-
ing the "serious constitutional question" feared by the Court an illusory
one.97 He contended that Congress, by enacting section 102(c) of the
NSA, had precluded review of both the statutory and constitutional
claims.98 He stated that the Court was inconsistent in finding the deci-
sion both unreviewable under the APA and reviewable under the Consti-
tution, since Congress intended termination decisions to be the Director's
90. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
91. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803); U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
92. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). For
other examples of preclusion of constitutional review by the Court itself, see Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (case dismissed for lack of injury required for standing to sue);
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (case dismissed on account of mootness); United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (case dismissed because claim not ripe).
93. 108 S. Ct. at 2054.
94. Id. (citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12
(1986)).
95. Id. at 2053 (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974)).
96. Id. For a recent application of the Webster constitutional preclusion analysis, see
Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the CIA's denial of a security
clearance to a homosexual is reviewable under the Constitution).
97. 108 S. Ct. at 2058-60 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
98. Id. at 2058, 2060-61 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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alone.9 9
Justice O'Connor dissented with respect to the constitutional preclu-
sion portion, arguing that Congress can and did preclude constitutional
review of the Director's decisions under section 102(c) for the inferior
courts only."o She based this argument on the President's exclusive con-
stitutional power over international relations.'O°
C. Analysis
The Court's avoidance of the difficult constitutional question is un-
derstandable. The NSA contains no language specifically precluding ju-
dicial review of constitutional claims. Therefore, any attempt by the
Court to resolve the inherent tension in our delicate system of separation
of powers and in Article III itself would have been inappropriate.
If a case presented itself in which such preclusion were explicit, one
could only hope the Court would not subordinate national ideals for na-
tional security. Since Marbury vs. Madison,1"2 the Court has largely rec-
ognized and protected its role under our tripartite form of government to
interpret and apply the Constitution. Any derogation of the judiciary's
role of implementing the Constitution would undermine both the intent
of the Framers and the liberties they sought to protect. As the Court
stated in United States v. Robel °3 "It would indeed be ironic if, in the
name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of those lib-
erties ... which make the defense of the Nation worthwhile." 1°4
IV. Equal Protection Analysis
The Court in Webster avoided not only the issue of the constitution-
ality of preclusion of constitutional review, but also the issue of the avail-
ability of equal protection analysis to homosexuals who allege
governmental discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Thus,
the Court dodged the important, unresolved question at the heart of the
case: whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class entitled to height-
ened judicial scrutiny when faced with discriminatory governmental
action.
99. Id. at 2060 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2054-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor presumably relied on Article III, § I of the Constitution for the proposition that
Congress' power to "ordain and establish" the inferior courts gives it authority to curtail their
judicial power. Justice Scalia adopted a similar argument in his dissent. See id. at 2058
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2055 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
103. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
104. Id. at 264.
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The Court did not disturb the court of appeals' decision that Doe
had presented an arguable constitutional claim of impermissible discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation."°5 Although the Government
argued that Doe's admission in his amended complaint that he had en-
gaged in homosexual activities was sufficient to dispose of his constitu-
tional claims, °6 the Court remanded the case to the District Court to
"address respondent's constitutional claims and the propriety of the equi-
table remedies sought."'0 7
The most recent opportunity taken by the Court to adjudge the con-
stitutional rights of homosexuals was in Bowers v. Hardwick, °5 which
devastated the gay community by denying any privacy right for sexual
relations between homosexuals.'0 9 In Webster, however, the Court of-
fered some hope of greater sensitivity to the rights of homosexuals by
remanding the case for further consideration of Doe's constitutional
claims. This indicates some possibility that the Court will establish equal
protection rights for homosexuals in the future.
A. Bowers v. Hardwick and Its Aftermath
In 1986 the Court faced a challenge to a Georgia statute making
sodomy a criminal offense. Respondent, a homosexual, questioned the
constitutionality of the sodomy statute after being charged with violation
of the statute for engaging in the act with a consenting partner in his own
bedroom." 0 The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, undertook to
decide the question "whether the Federal Constitution confers a funda-
mental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invali-
dates the laws of many States that still make such conduct illegal and
have done so for a very long time." ''
Finding that sodomy bears no resemblance to family, marriage, or
procreation, the Court first determined that homosexual activity is not
protected by any of the existing line of cases upholding a constitutional
right of privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 1 2 Next, observing that prohibition of sodomy is ancient and wide-
spread, the Court refused to bestow heightened judicial protection on
homosexual sodomy because it did not recognize the right to engage in
105. 108 S. Ct. at 2054 n.9.
106. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6, at 27-28 n.23.
107. 108 S. Ct. at 2054.
108. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
109. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
110. 478 U.S. at 187-88.
111. Id. at 190.
112. Id. at 189. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy encompasses
a woman's decision to have an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right
of privacy protects the use of contraceptives by married couples); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (right of privacy encompasses family relationships).
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such activity as a fundamental liberty interest." 3 The Court instead ap-
plied a rational basis test, claiming that "majority sentiments about the
morality of homosexuality" were adequate to support the statute.' 1 4
Bowers provided new ammunition that some courts have used to
continue the assault on homosexual rights already begun with cases like
Dronenburg v. Zech. 15 In Dronenburg, a Navy petty officer discharged
for homosexual conduct brought an action challenging the Navy's policy
and seeking an order for his reinstatement on the grounds that the dis-
charge violated his right to privacy and his right to equal protection of
the laws. Judge Robert Bork spoke for a three-judge panel, which in-
cluded then-Judge Scalia, in finding that private homosexual conduct
was not constitutionally protected." 6 Citing the interest of "morale and
discipline" in the military, the possibility of relationships developing be-
tween members of the Navy, "the possibility of homosexual seduction"
by military superiors, and the dislike and disapproval likely to be gener-
ated among those members of the armed forces who find homosexuality
morally offensive, 1 7 the court refused, much as the Supreme Court did
in Bowers, to extrapolate, from the cases establishing a constitutional
right to privacy, a general principle in favor of protecting homosexuals'
right to engage in sex.' 18 The court also asserted without explanation
that a favorable resolution of appellant's equal protection argument "is
to some extent dependent upon" a finding of a right of privacy." 9 Ap-
parently analyzing the equal protection claim under a fundamental rights
theory only, the court made no mention of the other branch of the mod-
em equal protection standard applying heightened scrutiny to suspect
classifications. 20 Thus, the court disposed of appellant's equal protec-
tion claim without further consideration.
The D. C. Circuit followed this approach to equal protection analy-
sis in Padula v. Webster.'21 In Padula, however, the issue presented was
whether homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, not
113. 478 U.S. at 191-94.
114. Id. at 196.
115. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
116. Id. at 1396.
117. Id. at 1398.
118. Id. at 1396.
119. Id. at 1391.
120. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), Justice Powell spelled out the modem equal protection standard, building on Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The test outlined in Rodriguez indicates that when govern-
mental action abridges a fundamental right or creates a class with "traditional indicia of sus-
pectness," it is subject to the "most exacting scrutiny," and the government must show both
that it has a compelling interest in making the classification and that the law is narrowly
tailored to legitimate governmental interests to withstand this strict scrutiny. 411 U.S. at 28.
See Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 645, 646 (1975).
121. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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whether homosexuals have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. 122
Nevertheless, the court defined the class "as persons who engage in ho-
mosexual conduct,"12 3 and interpreted Dronenburg to have settled the
question of equal protection "by its conclusion that the Constitution does
not afford a privacy right to engage in homosexual conduct."124 Thus,
the court rejected appellant's equal protection argument finding that it
would be "anomalous... to declare status defined by conduct that states
may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny .... ,"125
Other courts have evaluated equal protection claims of homosexuals
independently of the fundamental rights question foreclosed by Bowers.
In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 12 6
plaintiffs challenged the Department of Defense's practice of subjecting
active homosexual applicants for security clearance to increased investi-
gation, delays, and mandatory adjudication by a committee set up to re-
view only candidates with adverse or questionable information in their
preliminary background checks. 27 The court found that "[Bowers v.]
Hardwick does not address the level of scrutiny classifications that disad-
vantage lesbians and gay men should receive under the equal protection
clause. Hardwick holds only that under the due process clause lesbians
and gay men have no fundamental right to engage in sodomy."' 28 The
court decided that homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class.1 29
The High Tech court also distinguished "sodomy" as defined by the
Georgia statute in Bowers v. Hardwick from general "affectional and sex-
ual intimacy" and found a fundamental right to engage in the latter.1 30
Although the court acknowledged a significant governmental interest in
protecting national security, it determined that the Department of De-
fense's policies and procedures regarding homosexuals were "neither
closely related, substantially related, or rationally related to the govern-
ment's interest . ,.*1"' Thus, the court concluded that the govern-
ment's actions were violative of homosexuals' constitutional rights of
privacy and equal protection.' 32
In Watkins v. U.S. Army, 133 the Ninth Circuit faced another chal-
lenge to employment discrimination against homosexuals in the national
122. 822 F. 2d at 102.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 103 (citing Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1391 & 1398).
125. Id. The Seventh Circuit recently adopted this approach. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881
F. 2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
126. 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
127. Id. at 1366.
128. Id. at 1369 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188).
129. Id. at 1368.
130. Id. at 1370.
131. Id. at 1377.
132. Id.
133. 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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security context. Watkins, an open homosexual, had been the subject of
repeated Army investigations during his distinguished fourteen-year ca-
reer with the Army because of his admissions of homosexuality. 34 After
promulgating a regulation mandating the discharge of all homosexuals in
1981,135 the Army decided to discharge Watkins.136 A panel of the
Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge William Norris, initially found
that the Army's regulations discriminated on the basis of homosexuality
(or sexual orientation), as distinguished from sexual activity, and that
nothing in Bowers made discrimination by the government on the basis of
sexual orientation permissible. 37 The panel determined that Bowers was
"a substantive due process case," and its concern about limiting judicial
intervention applied only to interpretation of the unwritten right of pri-
vacy.' 38 Proceeding to Watkins' equal protection claim, the panel con-
cluded that homosexuals constitute a suspect class meriting strict
scrutiny and that "the regulations are not necessary to promote a legiti-
mate compelling governmental interest."'139
On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit held that the Army was
estopped from barring Watkins' reenlistment on the basis of his homo-
sexuality. I4I Thus, the court found it "unnecessary to reach the constitu-
tional issues raised" in the panel's decision.' 4'
B. Analysis
Although indicating a possible willingness to consider protection of
homosexuals from improper classifications by government, the Webster
decision failed to clear up the confusion in this area of law. The message
from Bowers was indecisive and has produced inconsistent results. It is
possible to interpret the decision as Padula did and disregard any equal
protection claims of members of the class whose "defining characteris-
tic," the practice of sodomy, may be constitutionally criminalized. It is
also possible to view homosexuality as a suspect or quasi-suspect classifi-
cation deserving heightened judicial scrutiny 42 when faced with discrim-
inatory governmental practices.
134. Id. at 701-04.
135. Id. at 702.
136. Id. at 702-03.
137. 847 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989).
138. 847 F.2d at 1340.
139. Id. at 1351.
140. 875 F.2d at 704-05.
141. Id. at 705. Contra id. at 711 (Norris, J., concurring); Id. at 731 (Conby, J.,
concurring).
142. This Comment uses the term "heightened judicial scrutiny" to include both strict
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny. See supra note 120 and accompanying text, and infra notes
150-154 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has identified several factors bearing on the de-
termination of whether a classification deserves heightened judicial scru-
tiny in an equal protection analysis. These include history of purposeful
discrimination,143 relationship of the trait that defines the class to ability
to perform or contribute to society, 1" unique disabilities faced by the
class because of prejudice and antipathy,145 immutability of the trait, 146
and impairment of the group's political voice, making it a discrete and
insular minority.147 Substantial evidence exists that gays have long suf-
fered from ridicule and discrimination, that their homosexuality does not
lessen their capability to contribute to society, and that homosexuals face
great disabilities in employment and social life, as evidenced by the ten-
dency of many to hide their homosexuality even today. 148 In addition,
increasing evidence indicates that homosexuality is at least partially
immutable. 149
In Craig v. Boren, 5' the Court articulated a formal standard of re-
view known as intermediate scrutiny: "classifications by gender must
143. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); San Antonio In-
dep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972).
144. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
145. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-44; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
146. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (preju-
dice against discreet and insular minorities may merit heightened judicial scrutiny).
148. See M. WEINBERG & C. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS: THEIR PROBLEMS AND
ADAPTATIONS 17-26 (1974) (arguing that the Judeo-Christian tradition and American Puri-
tanism have contributed to an antisexual morality in the United States that degrades and pe-
nalizes homosexuality as deviant sexual expression); V. BULLOUGH, HOMOSEXUALITY: A
HISTORY 1-2 (1979) (describing the adverse effects of the derogatory terms, stereotypes, and
misconceptions applied to homosexuals); J. KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIAN AND
GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 11-128 (1976) (documenting oppression of homosexuals); A. BELL
& M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES 229-30 (1978) (arguing that irrational stereotypes held
against homosexuals have resulted in misconceptions and discrimination); W. DuBAY, GAY
IDENTITY: THE SELF UNDER BAN 96-97 (1987) (arguing that gay-identified persons have been
stigmatized and oppressed); J. D'EMILIO & E. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 292-94, 347 (1988) (depicting social, political and physical attacks
on homosexuals). See also Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexual-
ity as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985) (arguing for application of
heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause to classifications based on homosexual-
ity); Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifi-
cations Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984) [hereinafter Note, An
Argument] (arguing that homosexuality should be a suspect classification).
149. Some researchers have concluded that sexual preference is immutable because of bio-
logical predisposition or factors in early development. E.g., A. BELL, M. WEINBERG & S.
HAMMERSMITH, SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN 190-92,
212-20 (1981) (finding that homosexual orientation is deeply ingrained and may have a biologi-
cal basis); S. HOLBROOK, FIGHTING BACK: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY RIGHTS 9-10 (1987)
(arguing that sexual preference is not determined by individual choice). See Note, An Argu-
ment, supra note 148, at 817-21 and authorities cited therein.
150. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives."' 51 The Court also applied this
"quasi-suspect" classification to illegal aliens in Plyer v. Doe.152 Because
"undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal"
and is not "an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product
of conscious, indeed unlawful, action," '153 the Court applied intermediate
scrutiny to hold a Texas statute denying public education to illegal alien
children violative of equal- protection. 154
Homosexuality is amenable to intermediate scrutiny analysis, espe-
cially in the national security context. As Bowers, Dronenburg, and
Padula indicate,I55 homosexuality and homosexual activity are not irrele-
vant to all legitimate legislative goals, because of society's interest in"
maintaining morality, discipline in the military, and public health, espe-
cially in light of the AIDS crisis. The classifications should be forced to
closely serve proper and important governmental purposes, however, be-
cause of the discrimination and disabilities faced by homosexuals.
The Court should act now to curb the confusion and unfairness sur-
rounding Bowers. It should tackle the difficult issue of equal protection
for homosexuals and the "irrational prejudice and outmoded stereo-
types"'156 that have plagued homosexuals since ancient times.
157
Conclusion
In Webster v. Doe the Supreme Court laid the foundation for a deci-
sion extending heightened equal protection analysis to governmental
classifications based on sexual orientation. Although the Court chose to
utilize its "no meaningful standard" inquiry to circumvent the language
of the APA and deny judicial review thereunder, it did preserve the right
of constitutional review of CIA employment termination decisions
notwithstanding Congress' grant of broad discretion. This preservation
151. Id. at 197. See also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding social secur-
ity provision affording women a chance at higher old-age benefits as serving the important
governmental objective of remedying past economic discrimination); Mississippi Univ. for Wo-
men v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking down a statute allowing only females to attend
nursing school as not substantially related to any important governmental objective).
152. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
153. Id. at 220.
154. Id. at 223-50.
155. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), see supra text accompanying notes 110-114;
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F. 2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), see supra text accompanying notes 115-
120; Padula v. Webster, 822 F. 2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987), see supra text accompanying notes 56-
60 & 121-125.
156. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1373
(N.D. Cal. 1987).
157. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189-91; V. BULLOUGH, HOMOSEXUALITY: A HISTORY 2-16
(1979).
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of constitutional review was not only prudent; it protected the preemi-
nence of the Constitution and the courts' power to enforce it.
The Court should now use this power to address the questions left
open by Bowers. The Court refused to entertain the government's argu-
ment in Webster that Doe had failed to present a valid constitutional
claim, but it did nothing to settle the disagreement in the lower courts
over the proper level of scrutiny to be applied.
Since homosexuals share many of the same disabilities faced by
other protected classes and have long suffered discrimination and preju-
dice, a heightened level of scrutiny should be applied to classifications
based on sexual orientation. Such a decision would be a logical extension
of the precedent that this Court has inherited, which has boldly contrib-
uted to the end of discrimination based on race, alienage, national origin,
illegitimacy and gender. Webster's preservation of constitutional review
for discretionary acts of agencies of the federal government has laid the
foundation. Now the Court should use the strong constitutional frame-
work of equal protection to uphold the values it is designed to protect.
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